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Abstract 
Electronic networks of practice are self-organizing, open activity systems 
focused on a shared practice that exist primarily through computer-mediated 
communication.  These networks create a public good of knowledge that is 
available to anyone in the network, making it easy for individuals to free-ride on 
the efforts of others.  Theories of collective action are reviewed to explain why 
individuals choose to actively participate in collective activities when the 
rational individual decision would be to free-ride on the efforts of others.  These 
theories are applied to examine participation in electronic networks of practice, 
suggesting that participation in these networks is dependent upon 1) the 
attributes of the individuals in the collective, 2) the relational structure of social 
ties between individuals in the collective, 3) the norms of behavior of the 
collective, 4) the affective factors of the collective, and 5) the development of 
sanctions for noncompliance with network norms.  This paper discusses how the 
ability of a network to leverage these factors to promote collective action is 
dependent upon the openness of the network, the extent to which the relationships 
in the collective are based on computer-mediated communication, and the extent 
to which the critical resources in the network are characterized by public or 
private goods. 
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CONTRIBUTION 
This paper advances information systems and virtual organization research by integrating 
public goods, social dilemmas and collective action theories with the study of online social 
structures.  The paper illustrates how the specific characteristics of electronic social networks 
influence knowledge contribution and the sustainability of the network, using an electronic 
network of practice as a baseline case.  Its contribution is important for the organization and 
comparison of prior research as well as essential for advancing the current state of the field. 
Another contribution is the summary of existing research on collective action from the fields of 
sociology and economics and how these theories are relevant for IS research.  The paper can 
help new entrants to the field of virtual organizing gain a basic understanding of the dynamics 
underlying online social networks.  This research is also significant for researchers in the fields 
of electronic communities and virtual organizing, both theoretically and practically in terms of 
future study design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in information and 
communication technologies have led to the 
emergence of online social structures where 
the primary purpose is knowledge exchange.  
The study of these online social structures is 
critical because they have fundamentally 
altered our understanding of how and why 
people share knowledge, by removing the 
barriers of same place and same time 
communication.  Using computer-mediated 
communication technologies, such as 
newsgroups, listservers and bulletin boards, an 
unlimited number of geographically dispersed 
individuals with diverse organizational, 
national, and demographic backgrounds share 
knowledge by helping each other solve 
problems, telling stories of personal 
experiences, and debating issues based on 
shared interest (Sproull and Faraj 1995; Wasko 
and Faraj 2000).  Electronic networks enable 
individuals to interact around a specific 
practice, regardless of physical proximity or 
prior personal acquaintance, eliminating the 
need for people to know one another in order 
to communicate.  This increases an 
individual’s access to knowledge resources by 
amassing greater numbers of like-minded 
individuals through electronic links than 
previously available in a local community.  
This increased access improves the likelihood 
of connecting to others who are able and 
willing to help.  Electronic networks also 
support new combinations of existing 
knowledge and the creation of new knowledge 
(Teigland 2003; Teigland and Wasko 2003).  
Since electronic message postings are openly 
available, individuals do not have to anticipate 
the specific information needs of others nor do 
they have to identify the synergistic 
possibilities that arise from the potential 
combinations of information from multiple 
sources (Fulk et al. 1996).     
While interest in the organizing 
processes underlying online social structures 
focused on knowledge continues to grow, we 
know, however, surprisingly little about how 
or why these structures support knowledge 
exchange (Desanctis and Monge 1999; Lin 
2001).  For instance, an enduring characteristic 
of these structures is the propensity of 
individuals to provide their valuable 
knowledge and insights to strangers (Kollock 
and Smith 1996; Rheingold 1993; Wasko and 
Faraj 2000), yet why individuals participate in 
this activity when there is no obvious benefit 
to them remains not well understood.  
Furthermore, the availability of technology to 
support communication does not necessarily 
translate into the creation of open discussion 
forums focused on knowledge exchange.  As 
management in many organizations has 
discovered, the creation of an online social 
space is no guarantee that knowledge sharing 
will actually take place (Alavi and Leidner 
1999; Orlikowski 1996).   While researchers 
have examined why individuals share 
knowledge online with strangers using theories 
such as weak ties (Constant et al. 1996), the 
resource-based view of resource availability 
and benefit provision (Butler 2001), 
generalized gift exchange (Kollock 1999), and 
public goods (Fulk et al. 1996; Kollock 1998; 
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Kollock and Smith 1996; Rafaeli and LaRose 
1993), these studies focused on different types 
of online social structures.  Without clearly 
defining the phenomenon of interest or the key 
characteristics describing that phenomenon, 
researchers are unable to apply specific 
overarching theories that are appropriate and 
generalizable across studies, which further 
impedes our ability to build upon prior 
research and advance the field. 
In order to better understand online 
social structures, we must be clear on what it is 
that we are discussing.  The purpose of this 
paper is to advance the current state of the 
field by providing a model of one type of 
online social structure in order to make a 
baseline for research and improve the ability to 
compare across settings.  While recognizing 
that there are many forms of online social 
structures, we begin by defining and 
describing the key characteristics of one, an 
electronic network of practice, in order to 
build a theoretical framework around a 
baseline case.  We propose that theories of 
public goods, social dilemmas and collective 
action are informative for understanding the 
organizing principles and dynamics of 
knowledge exchange in these networks.  We 
conclude by discussing the theoretical 
implications for changing some of the 
underlying characteristics of our definition, 
noting how alterations to the definition change 
the parameters of the network and the theories 
that may be applied.  By doing so, we hope 
that this paper will be useful to researchers 
interested in the organizing processes of online 
social structures by providing insights into 
how to apply collective action theories within 
specific contexts. 
DEFINING AN ELECTRONIC NETWORK 
OF PRACTICE 
We refer to online social structures 
focused on knowledge exchange as “electronic 
networks of practice”.  Although prior 
researchers have used the term “community” 
to describe these structures (i.e., electronic 
community of practice, electronic community, 
or virtual community), following Brown and 
Duguid (2000) we use the term “network of 
practice” to distinguish these social structures 
from “communities of practice”.  According to 
Brown and Duguid (2000), both terms describe 
work-related networks where the common 
denominator is a shared practice and both are 
critical for understanding learning and the 
sharing of knowledge.  They describe 
communities of practice as a subsection of 
larger networks of practice, but that consist of 
a relatively tight-knit group of members who 
know each other and work together, who 
typically communicate face-to-face, and who 
continually negotiate, communicate and 
coordinate with each other directly.  These 
demands of direct communication and 
coordination limit the size of the community, 
enhance the formation of strong interpersonal 
ties, and create strong norms of direct 
reciprocity between members (Brown and 
Duguid 2000).  
Networks of practice refer to social 
structures that link similar individuals engaged 
in a shared practice, but who may never get to 
know one another or meet face-to-face.  These 
networks typically consist of weak ties where 
individuals coordinate through third parties 
such as professional associations or indirect 
ties such as newsletters, websites, bulletin 
boards and listservers (Brown and Duguid 
2000).  We adopt the term network rather than 
community to distinguish between collectives 
characterized by sparsely connected weak, 
indirect ties and collectives where members 
are connected through frequent face-to-face 
interactions and direct personal ties.  We add 
the term “electronic” to highlight that 
communication and coordination within this 
type of network of practice occurs through 
asynchronous computer-mediated 
communication and that the focal network 
structure exists solely in electronic space.  The 
purpose of the network is to engage in 
knowledge exchange around a specific 
practice, and the network structure consists of 
the aggregation of ties between individuals 
that are created when individuals post and 
respond to messages.  More precisely, we 
define an electronic network of practice as a 
self-organizing, open activity system focused 
on a shared practice that exists through 
computer-mediated communication.  These 
four defining characteristics are essential for 
understanding how individuals communicate, 
coordinate and interact in these networks.   
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First, participation in an electronic 
network of practice is self-organizing and 
voluntary.  Individuals choose whether or not 
they want to participate as well as how often 
they participate, ranging from simple 
observation (lurking) to active participation.  
Individuals voluntarily choose the manner in 
which they participate, such as posting 
questions, replies, general comments, or a 
mixture of these.  Individuals also decide what 
they want to contribute, such as the specific 
knowledge they are willing to disclose and 
how much effort they are willing to expend.  
Because participation is self-organizing and 
voluntary, knowledge seekers have no control 
over who responds to their questions or the 
quality of the responses.  Knowledge 
contributors have no assurances that the 
seekers being helped will ever reciprocate the 
favor, and lurkers may draw upon the 
knowledge of others without contributing.  
This feature of self-organizing, voluntary 
participation distinguishes electronic networks 
of practice from virtual project teams, 
workgroups or other collectives in which 
individuals are assigned tasks, required to 
participate and expected to coordinate their 
efforts to fulfill a specific obligation or goal.   
Second, participation is open to anyone 
with an interest in the shared practice.  As long 
as an individual has access to the technology, 
participation is freely available regardless of 
physical location, demographics, 
organizational affiliation, social position or 
personal expertise.  Access to the network is 
open to individuals even if they do not actively 
post or contribute to others.  Any individual 
with an interest in the practice may simply lurk 
on the network or may draw upon the 
knowledge of others by posting a question 
without contributing anything in return.  This 
characteristic of open participation 
differentiates an electronic network of practice 
from other networks or collectives where 
individuals are designated and assigned or 
where there are limits on membership. 
Third, an electronic network of practice 
is an activity system focused on a shared 
practice.  Knowledge exchange occurs through 
the mutual engagement revolving around a 
shared practice, creating an activity system in 
which individuals help each other solve 
problems by interacting with one another.  
Individuals requiring help post a question, 
reaching out to others who may provide 
knowledge and insight in response.  This 
posting and responding to messages is similar 
to what occurs in face-to-face collaborations, 
representing the active mutual engagement in 
problem solving.  While the purpose of the 
network is to exchange knowledge around a 
shared practice, such as programming 
languages, dieting, sports, or religion, the 
actual topic of the shared practice is not 
relevant to our definition.  What is relevant is 
that the mutual engagement focuses on the 
sharing of practice-related knowledge.  This 
feature of mutual engagement in a shared 
practice distinguishes electronic networks of 
practice from static forms of written 
communication such as user manuals, content 
delivering websites, document repositories, or 
other types of databases.   
Fourth, an electronic network of 
practice exists solely through computer-
mediated communication.  This characteristic 
indicates that the focal network of interest is 
the one that is created through message 
postings that are asynchronous and text-based, 
which has a profound influence on how 
knowledge is actually shared and exchanged 
(Daft and Lengel 1986).  Unlike knowledge 
exchange through verbal communication, the 
knowledge contained in message postings is 
codified.  This codified knowledge may be 
made available to anyone with an interest in 
the shared practice and archived for future 
reference, regardless of an individual’s 
participation in the original exchange.  The 
technology replaces the need for same-time 
interactions (typical of synchronous 
communications) or same-place interactions, 
enabling individuals to participate at their own 
convenience.  The technology removes 
physical restrictions based on the size of the 
network in terms of the number of participants, 
the quantity of messages, or even the size of 
the messages exchanged.  Participation and 
interaction occur between people regardless of 
personal acquaintance, familiarity, or location.  
This sharply contrasts with other networks or 
collectives such as communities of practice, 
project teams, or workgroups, in which people 
typically know one another and interact over 
time, thereby creating expectations of 
obligation and direct reciprocity that are 
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enforceable through social sanctions.  
However, this feature of existing solely in 
electronic space does not mean that an 
electronic network of practice may not also 
support a physical entity, such as a 
professional association, nor does it mean 
members cannot engage in private 
communication outside of the electronic 
network of practice.  Rather an electronic 
network of practice may exist within a wider 
network of practice. 
For the purposes of this paper, we focus 
on the case of a “pure” electronic network of 
practice where participation is completely self-
organizing and all participation is voluntary, 
the network is open to anyone with a 
connection to the Internet, the interactions 
reflect mutual engagement in a shared practice, 
and the focal network exists solely in 
electronic space without a comparable physical 
entity.  We also limit our focus to electronic 
networks of practice that publish all message 
postings and make these messages available in 
an archive.  This type of electronic network of 
practice is of particular interest as a baseline 
case because the basic tenets of what we 
theoretically know about knowledge exchange 
do not hold true in this context.  For example, 
prior studies on knowledge exchange have 
consistently found that knowledge sharing is 
positively related to factors such as strong ties 
(Wellman and Wortley 1990), co-location 
(Allen 1977; Kraut et al. 1990), demographic 
similarity (Pelled 1996), status similarity 
(Cohen and Zhou 1991), and a history of prior 
relationship (Krackhardt 1992).   
Although this “pure” case of an 
electronic network of practice may seem 
restrictive, there are tens of thousands of these 
electronic networks of practice currently 
thriving on the Internet, such as Usenet 
newsgroups.  The Usenet was created in 1981 
and is a key element of the Internet that has 
grown to include over twenty-five thousand 
different interest newsgroups with more than 
half a million postings per day by 1999 (Dern 
1999).  In addition to Usenet, there are 
thousands of other electronic networks of 
practice openly available through major portals 
such as Yahoo, AOL and Google.  We limit 
our focus to the baseline case in order to 
develop a theoretical framework that is 
specific to this context.  After articulating the 
theoretical framework for the baseline case, we 
conclude by discussing the implications for 
changing our definition, thereby enabling 
researchers to adapt the theoretical framework 
presented here to fit the specific context of 
interest. 
INTRODUCING THEORIES OF PUBLIC 
GOODS, SOCIAL DILEMMAS, AND 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Having defined electronic networks of 
practice, we now turn to theories of public 
goods, social dilemmas, and collective action 
to help us better understand the social and 
structural dynamics underlying electronic 
networks of practice. We begin with a 
discussion of public goods.   
Characteristics of Public Goods 
Public goods are typically associated 
with two characteristics: nonrivalry and 
nonexcludability.  The most basic definition of 
a public good is that it is a good that is 
nonrival.  Nonrival means that a good is not 
used up or depleted in its consumption 
(Shmanske 1991).  Typical examples of public 
goods include tangible goods such as public 
parks and lighthouses, as well as intangible or 
information goods such as public television 
and radio.  Paul Samuelson (1954) first 
examined the nonrival characteristic of a 
public good and claimed that although 
perfectly competitive markets could bring 
about the optimal solution for private goods, 
no such market mechanisms existed for public 
goods. He concluded that public sector 
intervention would be necessary to avoid the 
underproduction of public goods.   
The second characteristic associated 
with public goods is nonexcludability (Head 
1962).  Nonexcludability occurs when 
noncontributors cannot be excluded from 
consuming the good.  In other words, 
nonexcludable goods are goods that all 
individuals in a collective may use and benefit 
from regardless of their contribution to its 
production or maintenance.  Public goods are 
generally considered to evidence both nonrival 
and nonexcludable characteristics.  Because 
public goods are not depleted in their 
consumption due to nonrivalry, there is no 
incentive to add costs by controlling access to 
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the public good through exclusion (Musgrave 
1959).  However, a connection between the 
two characteristics of nonrivalry and 
nonexcludablility does not necessarily exist: a 
nonrival good can be excludable while a 
nonexcludable good can be either rival or non-
rival (Shmanske 1991).   
Social Dilemmas 
Since Samuelson’s seminal article, 
literally hundreds of articles have been 
published supporting, critiquing, and 
expanding on the issues of public goods, and 
much of this research has concluded that 
public goods are subject to underproduction by 
a collective (Shmanske 1991).  The nonrival 
nature of a public good allows the good and its 
benefit to be offered to everyone in the 
collective, and nonexcludability influences 
individual decision-making about participation 
in the production, maintenance, or 
consumption of the public good.  In particular, 
the issue of nonexcludability results in the 
tendency to free-ride, i.e., to consume the 
public good without contributing to its 
production or maintenance.  In fact, the 
optimal individual decision is to free-ride and 
consume the public good without contributing 
anything in return.  However, if everyone 
decided not to contribute, the public good 
would not be created and everyone in the 
collective would be worse off.   
This paradox has been conceptualized 
as the well-known “Prisoner’s Dilemma”.  In 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two prisoners are 
taken into custody and immediately separated.  
These prisoners have two choices: to confess 
or not to confess.  If both choose not to 
confess, then they receive a light sentence (one 
year).  If both confess, they will both serve 
time, but will serve the minimum sentence 
(five years).  If one confesses and the other 
does not, then the confessor will receive a very 
light sentence (6 months) and the nonconfessor 
receives the maximum (10 years).  In this 
scenario, the dominant strategy is always to 
confess (defect) regardless of what the other 
prisoner chooses.  However, this dominant 
strategy would lead to a defect-defect result 
even though both prisoners would prefer the 
cooperate-cooperate strategy (neither 
confesses).  Thus, the equilibrium resulting 
from each individual choosing the best 
individual strategy is not a Pareto-optimal 
outcome, i.e., where there is no other outcome 
that is strictly preferred by at least one 
individual that is at least as good for the 
others.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma game has 
been expanded to the N-person Prisoner’s 
Dilemma to examine the rational behaviors of 
more than two individuals, where universal 
cooperation is preferred to universal defection 
yet the preferred outcome is individual 
defection (Heckathorn 1996).  The paradox 
that rational individual decisions lead to 
collectively irrational outcomes suggests that it 
is impossible for rational individuals to 
cooperate. 
Mancur Olson (1965) examined this 
difficulty of getting individuals to pursue 
collective interests to produce a public good in 
the Logic of Collective Action.  Olson 
proposed that when the nature of the 
organization and services are such that no 
individual can be excluded from their benefits, 
self-interest dictates that an individual should 
allow the others in the collective to provide the 
good and then free-ride on these efforts.  
Basing his arguments on the premise of free-
riding, Olson specifically set out to challenge 
the optimism of group theory that collective 
interests would lead to voluntary collective 
action (Ostrom 1990).  Olson suggested that 
individuals seek to reap the benefits of others’ 
participation while evading the costs to 
themselves because individuals who cannot be 
excluded from the benefits of a public good 
have little incentive to voluntarily contribute 
once the good is produced.  He concludes that 
in a large group, individuals perceive that their 
individual efforts have no noticeable effect so 
that even in the case where there is universal 
consensus and a desire from the collective to 
produce the public good, self-interest rather 
than collective action is more likely to occur 
(Olson 1965).     
These pessimistic conclusions 
predicting the underproduction of public goods 
have been termed social dilemmas.  Social 
dilemmas arise when a set of individuals act 
rationally in their own self-interest, yet the 
sum of their actions leads to collective 
irrationality (Kollock 1998).  There are two 
types of social dilemmas: the social fence and 
the tragedy of the commons.  The social fence 
refers to the production of public goods, where 
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the social dilemma arises because the optimal 
individual decision is to free-ride or enjoy the 
public good without contributing anything to 
its creation or maintenance.  The tragedy of the 
commons dilemma focuses on the 
consumption of a semi-public good, i.e., a 
good that is nonexcludable yet rival rather than 
nonrival.  Examples of such goods include 
common-pool resources, such as common 
grazing fields, fishing grounds or water 
supplies.  In the tragedy of the commons, the 
social dilemma arises because the optimal 
individual decision to free-ride destroys the 
common-pool resource, resulting in “the 
tragedy of the commons”.   
Although public goods are subject to 
social dilemmas, public goods are often 
created and maintained through collective 
action, even in the face of self-interest and the 
ability to free-ride.  In contrast to theories of 
social dilemmas, theories of collective action 
focus on how social dilemmas are avoided.  
Rather than focusing on free-riding behavior, 
collective action theories attempt to explain 
why individuals forego the tendency to free-
ride and contribute to collective benefits.  In 
the following section, we review collective 
action theories to highlight how collectives are 
able to overcome social dilemmas to create 
and maintain public goods. 
Collective Action 
Collective action is described as action 
based solely on the voluntary cooperation of 
individuals (Marwell and Oliver 1993) and 
typically involves the production of a public or 
semi-public good (Heckathorn 1996).  
Collective action researchers note that the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game is confined to a 
narrow set of assumptions: radical uncertainty 
and interdependent outcomes.  Once the 
assumption of radical uncertainty is relaxed, 
methods of cooperation emerge based on 
expectations of ongoing interactions – referred 
to as strategic interactions (Heckathorn 1996).  
Olson suggests that individuals forego the 
tendency to free-ride when individual efforts 
are visible to others in the collective, there are 
incentives for participation, and there exist 
mechanisms of coercion (Olson 1965).  
Overall, collective action theories focused on 
understanding the production of a public good 
break down into five related areas: 1) the 
attributes of the individuals in the collective, 
2) the relational structure of social ties 
between individuals in the collective, 3) the 
norms of behavior of the collective, 4) the 
affective factors of the collective, and 5) the 
sanctions for noncompliance.  We examine 
each area below. 
Attributes of Individuals in the Collective 
The first stream of collective action 
research proposes that the population’s 
heterogeneity of resources and interests affects 
collective action and the production of public 
goods (Hardin 1982; Oliver et al. 1985; Olson 
1965).  Research in this area focuses on the 
attributes of the individuals within the 
collective, such as the amount of an 
individual’s resources and his or her level of 
interest in seeing the good realized.  The 
heterogeneity of individual resources and 
interests is particularly relevant in collectives 
where the costs of providing the good are the 
same, regardless of the number of individuals 
contributing towards its provision.  In this 
case, the public good may be created and 
sustained through the actions of a few 
interested and resourceful individuals, leading 
researchers to propose that individuals who 
have a greater access to resources and a higher 
interest in seeing the good realized will be able 
to create and sustain the public good for the 
benefit of the collective.  This results in what 
Olson refers to as the “exploitation of the great 
by the small” (Olson 1965).  This situation 
may occur when at least some subset of more 
interested members has an incentive to see the 
public good provided, even if they have to bear 
the full burden of providing it themselves 
(Olson 1965).   
Relational Structure of Social Ties 
The second stream of research focuses 
on the attributes of the aggregate network 
structure of social ties representing the 
personal relationships that exist between 
individuals in the collective as a whole.  Initial 
research proposes that the overall frequency or 
density of social ties within a collective 
promotes collective action.  When networks 
are dense, consisting of direct ties between all 
members, collective action is relatively easier 
to achieve.  This argument goes back to Marx, 
who reasoned that the more individuals are in 
regular contact with one another, the more 
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likely they will develop a “habit of 
cooperation” and act collectively (Marwell and 
Oliver 1988).   
However, some collectives may be 
sustained through other patterns of 
interactions, especially if the collective benefit 
is achieved through the efforts of only a few 
individuals.  For instance, the pattern of 
interaction may resemble a reciprocal gift 
exchange.  Reciprocal exchanges occur when 
there is an exchange between two individuals 
with the expectation that the gift of help will 
be reciprocated some time in the future 
(Kollock 1999).  Public goods may also be 
provided through generalized exchange (Fulk 
et al. 1996).  A generalized exchange occurs 
when one’s giving is not reciprocated by the 
recipient, but by a third party (Ekeh 1974).  In 
contrast to dyadic exchange characterized by 
direct reciprocity and accountability, 
generalized exchange is based on indirect 
reciprocation and interest-based contribution.  
Thus, while it has been established that social 
ties are important for collective action, it is 
less well established as to exactly how and 
why social ties are important (Marwell and 
Oliver 1988). 
Norms of Collective Behavior 
Many researchers cite the importance 
of collective norms for supporting collective 
action (Coleman 1990; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
1998; Putnam 1995a; Putnam 1995b), and 
norms are commonly referred to as 
institutional structures, rules (Ostrom 1990) or 
conventions (Reisman 1990).  Norms are 
standards of acceptable conduct that guide and 
regulate the life of a collective and develop 
through repeated interactions over time 
(Coleman 1990; Putnam 2000).  Norms enable 
individuals to coordinate actions, provide 
stability, furnish information on socially 
acceptable behaviors, and act as a type of 
insurance that others will act accordingly 
(Reisman 1990).  Norms are a key component 
of collective action, regardless of the actual 
content or substance of the norm.  As Reisman 
notes, “It is the rule and not the content, after 
all, that ensures the requisite coordination of 
expectations and actions” (Reisman 1990).  
Coleman (1988) suggests that a norm exists 
when a socially defined right to control an 
action is held not by the actor but by others, 
representing a degree of consensus around 
social action.  Norms are important in that they 
allow collectives to function effectively to 
produce and maintain public goods by 
providing a structured set of rules for 
coordination, as well as setting expectations 
about acceptable behaviors and actions 
(Ostrom 1990).   
Collective Affective Factors 
Researchers suggest that a variety of 
affective factors, such as trust (McAllister 
1995; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Ring and 
Van de Ven 1994), influence collective action.  
Affective factors develop from the 
relationships between the individuals in the 
collective as well as the relationships between 
individuals and the collective as a whole.  
These affective factors have been referred to as 
social capital (Leana and Van Buren 1999; 
Putnam 1995b; Putnam 2000) and relational 
social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  
Other affective factors include obligation to 
the collective and identification with the 
collective (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998), 
affiliation (Leana and Van Buren 1999), 
commitment (Mowday et al. 1979), sentiment 
and ethical legitimation (Reisman 1990), and 
organizational citizenship (Organ 1988).  
These affective factors support collective 
action because individuals are more likely to 
suppress self-interest when there are strong, 
positive associations between individuals and 
the collective (Leana and Van Buren 1999). 
Collective Sanctions for Noncompliance 
Researchers note that collective action 
is more likely to occur in collectives that are 
able to enforce sanctions for noncompliance 
with collective norms (Olson 1965; Ostrom 
1990).  In order to enforce these sanctions, 
individual behavior in the collective must be 
monitored, which consumes time and 
resources that could be devoted to other 
activities (Ostrom 1990).  However, Olson 
contends that in large collectives individuals 
will prefer to free-ride unless they are 
restrained and defectors punished for their 
actions (Olson 1965).  This research concludes 
that the costs associated with monitoring 
behavior and enforcing sanctions are seen as 
necessary in order to sustain collective action.   
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In summary, the results from collective 
action research suggest that public goods are 
more likely to be created and sustained and 
social dilemmas avoided in collectives where 
there is a heterogeneity of resources and 
interests, a pattern of social ties that supports 
exchange, norms to guide collective behavior, 
strong affective ties between individuals and 
the collective, and collective sanctions punish 
self-interested behavior.   
APPLYING PUBLIC GOODS, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND SOCIAL 
DILEMMAS TO ELECTRONIC 
NETWORKS OF PRACTICE  
In this section, we apply theories of 
public goods, social dilemmas, and collective 
action to electronic networks of practice.  We 
focus on the purest form of our definition: 
networks that are completely self-emergent, 
open, based on the mutual engagement in a 
shared practice, and exist solely through 
computer-mediated communication.  These 
electronic networks of practice consist of a 
collective of individuals voluntarily engaged in 
actions that benefit the collective, and their 
actions create a public good of knowledge in 
the form of archived messages.  In the formal 
language of collective action theory, we 
suggest then that the participants in an 
electronic network of practice form the interest 
group or the collective.  These individuals act 
collectively to create a continuous stream of 
knowledge by posting and responding to 
messages, and the archive of collective 
knowledge produced by this interaction 
exhibits the key characteristics of a public 
good.  In terms of nonrivaly, the archive of 
collective knowledge is nonrival since the use 
of this knowledge by one individual does not 
deplete the supply of knowledge or diminish 
the capacity of other individuals to access and 
use the knowledge.  Because the archive of 
collective knowledge is purely nonrival, free-
riders do not place an extra burden on the 
network, reducing the need to restrict access 
through exclusion.  Therefore, in terms of 
nonexcludability, we focus on electronic 
networks of practice that are open to anyone 
with an interest in the practice, making the 
archive of collective knowledge 
nonexcludable.  When one participant 
responds to a posting, then all members may 
benefit even though they did not contribute to 
the original exchange.  Furthermore, the costs 
of posting a message to the network are the 
same, regardless of the number of individuals 
who benefit, indicating that the public good 
may be created and sustained through the 
efforts of a few individuals.     
In an electronic network of practice, the 
social dilemma arises since the individual 
rational decision is to access the knowledge 
produced by others in the network without 
contributing anything in return.  However, if 
all individuals were to behave in this manner 
then there would be no knowledge exchange, 
leaving everyone worse off.   This leads to an 
interesting area of potential research based on 
social dilemmas, the N-person Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and Olson’s Logic of Collective 
Action, which assume the calculative 
rationality of individual self-interest and the 
temptation to free-ride.  These theories may be 
useful for researchers interested in 
investigating free-riding and collective 
irrationality and why electronic networks of 
practice do not develop into active collectives 
that create and exchange knowledge.   
For example, prior research suggests 
that in many instances online social spaces 
created to enhance knowledge exchange 
simply remain empty spaces where no one 
contributes and some collectives lose 
participants and die out over time (Desanctis 
and Roach 2002).  Researchers assuming that 
rational individuals acting to maximize their 
own self-interest do not contribute to 
electronic networks of practice might examine 
how and when the costs of individual 
participation outweigh individual benefits.  
These costs may include individual time and 
effort, perceptions of self-efficacy, confidence 
in expressing oneself and submitting ideas to 
public exposure, barriers to entry such as skills 
with the technology or access to the 
technology.  In addition, theories of public 
goods and social dilemmas may provide 
insights into lurking behaviors, where lurking 
behavior is viewed as a self-interested act of 
free-riding. 
Additionally, theories of collective 
action are useful for researchers interested in 
examining how electronic networks of practice 
overcome social dilemmas.  Research in this 
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area could focus on the attributes of the 
individuals in the collective, the relational 
aggregate network structure created through 
social ties, the development and role of norms 
to guide collective behavior, the influence of a 
variety of affective factors, and the creation 
and use of collective sanctions for self-
interested behavior.  We highlight below how 
these streams of collective action research are 
applicable to electronic networks of practice. 
Attributes of Individuals in the Collective 
Researchers have proposed that the 
more heterogeneous a group is, the more likely 
that there is a critical mass or subset of 
members who have a high enough level of 
resources and/or interests to produce the public 
good (Oliver et al. 1985).  However, 
heterogeneity can also hinder collective action 
even when the mean levels of heterogeneity 
appear sufficient.  As such, it has been 
suggested that the distribution of heterogeneity 
is important in terms of collective action, i.e., 
the more positive skew and deviation from the 
mean, the more likely a critical mass may 
result (Oliver et al. 1985).  Hence, researchers 
interested in investigating why individuals 
participate and contribute messages to 
electronic networks of practice may want to 
consider the resources and interests of active 
participants.   
In terms of resources, prior research has 
found that individuals who have higher levels 
of professional expertise and organizational 
tenure (Constant et al. 1996) and those who 
lack access to private alternatives such as co-
workers or acquaintances (Wasko and 
Teigland 2002) are more likely to participate 
and provide useful advice in electronic 
networks.  Other resources might include time, 
access to technology or position in the 
particular practice.  In terms of interests, prior 
research indicates that individual motivations 
and interests such as reputation, 
organizational/community affiliation, access to 
a peer group, access to useful information, 
enjoyment and learning influence participation 
in electronic networks (Constant et al. 1996; 
Lakhani and von Hippel 2000; Wasko and 
Faraj 2000).  Researchers may also consider 
examining individual traits, such as an 
individual’s general propensity to help.  This 
kind of additional research on individual 
resources and interests would shed light on 
why individuals ask strangers for advice and 
why individuals help others in electronic 
networks of practice. 
Relational Structure of Social Ties 
Another area of potential research is the 
examination of the structure or the pattern of 
interactions and social ties within electronic 
networks of practice.  As mentioned, 
individual participation in electronic networks 
of practice is reflected in the posting of 
questions and replies that take the form of a 
thread.  This interaction creates a social tie 
between two participants, and these dyadic ties 
can be aggregated to examine the structure of 
social ties in the network as a whole.  Methods 
such as social network analysis are helpful for 
this type of examination (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994).  Research indicates that electronic 
networks of practice may have a network 
structure like a star, where a critical mass of 
individuals sustain the network by responding 
to all others in the network as a whole (Wasko 
and Teigland 2002).  Other electronic 
networks of practice may be characterized by a 
core/periphery structure consisting of an active 
group of core individuals who interact mainly 
among themselves or by multiple 
core/periphery structures, also known as 
cliques.   
The examination of the structure of 
social ties may also focus on the attributes of 
the social ties within the network.  For 
example, previous research on computer 
networks has indicated that the social ties in 
these networks may be of a strong, 
intermediate, or weak nature (Wellman et al. 
1996).  A structural examination of an 
electronic network of practice that includes the 
attributes as well as the pattern of ties may 
thus shed light on the factors leading to the 
creation of the public good.  Chances are that 
electronic networks of practice will exhibit a 
variety of network structures, but to date we 
know little about how network structure 
influences collective action or whether certain 
network structures are more sustainable or lead 
to higher outcomes, making this is another 
area in need of further research.   
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Norms of Collective Behavior 
In electronic networks of practice, prior 
research suggests that norms develop around 
appropriate conduct in the network (Wasko 
and Faraj 2000).  For instance, in some 
electronic networks of practice, new 
participants are expected to review frequently 
asked questions before posting their questions.  
Other electronic networks of practice establish 
various norms around the tone of the 
exchange, where breaches of “netiquette” 
result in flaming.  Organizational research 
suggests that norms of cooperation (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal 1998), reciprocity (Putnam 
1995b), openness and teamwork (Starbuck 
1992), and tolerance of both criticism and 
failure (Leonard-Barton 1995) are conducive 
to knowledge sharing.  However, we know 
little about how roles develop, how norms play 
a role in guiding behavior or whether certain 
norms are more supportive of collective action 
in electronic networks.  Thus, researchers 
interested in collective action in electronic 
networks of practice might consider examining 
the existence of norms in the collective, the 
general understanding of those norms across 
individuals, and the content of the norms that 
result in collective behaviors. 
Collective Affective Factors 
Affective factors such as relational 
social capital should also be relevant to the 
study of electronic networks of practice.  For 
example, in online settings researchers have 
found that people with a strong sense of 
identification and attachment are more likely 
to participate and assist others (Wellman and 
Gulia 1997) while individuals posting valuable 
advice to an intra-organizational electronic 
network were motivated by a sense of 
organizational citizenship (Constant et al. 
1996).  Individuals from computer-focused 
electronic networks noted that they 
participated and helped others due to a moral 
obligation similar to “been there, done that”, to 
pay back to the network and the profession as 
a whole (Teigland 2003; Wasko and Faraj 
2000), and to a sense of identification with the 
network and with the network’s goals 
(Lakhani and von Hippel 2000).  Additional 
research in this area is needed to better 
understand the relational nature of the 
relationships in the collective and would shed 
additional light on why some collectives 
succeed over others.   
Collective Sanctions for Noncompliance 
Lastly, while researchers note that 
collective action is more likely to occur in 
collectives that are able to enforce sanctions 
for noncompliance with collective norms, 
enforcing sanctions for noncompliance may be 
difficult or impossible in electronic networks 
of practice.  Although active participation in 
the network is fully visible and easy to 
monitor, the open, anonymous, and electronic 
nature of the network makes it difficult to 
render and enforce significant sanctions 
against free-riding or other forms of defection.  
Attempts at sanctions such as flaming and 
exclusion can be observed in electronic 
networks of practice, but their effectiveness is 
unknown.  For example, even when behavior 
is monitored and some form of sanction is 
applied, it is relatively simple for an individual 
to create a new electronic identity.  This makes 
sanctions another area that should be 
researched because of the unique 
characteristics of electronic networks of 
practice as a collective.  For example, evidence 
indicating that sanctions are not a necessary 
component of collective action in electronic 
networks would introduce an exciting 
alternative to current collective action theories.  
STUDYING ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF 
ELECTRONIC NETWORKS OF 
PRACTICE 
Thus far, we have argued that an 
electronic network of practice is a form of 
collective action consisting of a self-
organizing, open activity system focused on a 
shared practice that exists through computer-
mediated communication.  We argued that 
public goods, social dilemmas, and collective 
action are useful theoretical lenses for studying 
electronic networks of practice and highlighted 
areas of current and potential future research.  
Each aspect of our definition is important for 
applying these theories, and changing any part 
of the definition may alter the way the theories 
should be applied.  That is why a clear 
definition of the context under study is 
important for researchers.  In fact, we offer 
this specific definition of a “pure” electronic 
network of practice to address a baseline 
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situation in which one would expect the least 
amount of collective action.  Although this 
definition describes many online social 
structures that create an archive of collective 
knowledge (such as Usenet newsgroups, 
electronic bulletin boards, and listservers 
openly available on the Internet), there are 
many forms of electronic networks of practice 
that deviate from this definition and deserve 
separate study.  Here are some examples of 
what we propose happens when parts of the 
definition of electronic networks of practice 
are changed.     
Open Participation 
While our definition focuses on 
electronic networks of practice that are 
completely open, some electronic networks of 
practice may have restricted access.  For 
example, to belong to a network individuals 
may have to subscribe or pay membership 
fees, be members of a specific professional 
association or organization, or be 
recommended by other members.  
Theoretically, when access to a public good is 
limited, the public good becomes an 
excludable public good, which also has been 
referred to as a club good (Buchanan 1965).  
In public goods research, restricting access is 
typically only relevant to prevent crowding or 
to prevent nonpayers from accessing the public 
good.  This would suggest that in the case of 
electronic networks of practice, there is little 
motivation to add costs by controlling access 
to the public good.  In electronic networks of 
practice the public good of archived 
knowledge is not susceptible to crowding, and 
nonpayers (free-riders) do not place a burden 
on the network.  Restricting access may have 
negative effects such as reducing the potential 
value and benefits of the public good.  
Mechanisms of exclusion restrict access to 
knowledge and the potential synergies of new 
knowledge creation by excluding individuals 
who may be able to provide additional 
insights.  However, open networks may be 
more susceptible to free-riding or 
destructive/subversive behaviors.  As 
mentioned above, prior research proposes that 
limits to group size and restricted access serve 
to enhance collective action because individual 
behavior becomes more visible the higher the 
density of the network (Olson 1965).   
In the case where membership is 
restricted yet the collective is large enough that 
individuals are still typically strangers, then 
the collective action theories proposed above 
are still relevant.  For example, prior research 
indicates that electronic networks of practice 
are sustained by a subset of active individuals 
that develop a recognition of one another, and 
this subset is surrounded by a larger set of non-
recognizable individuals (Wasko and Teigland 
2002).  Based on collective action theories, we 
would expect that those individuals who are 
more connected to others in the network and 
feel stronger ties to the network are more 
likely to engage in collective action.  In this 
case, theories of collective action are still 
applicable, and theoretically we would expect 
that restricted access enhances collective 
action but potentially excludes interested 
individuals from participation.   
However, highly restricted access may 
result in personal acquaintance and 
recognition, so that individuals in the network 
are no longer strangers or relatively 
anonymous.  In this scenario, theories of social 
exchange based on dyadic relationships may 
be more relevant than collective action 
theories (Blau 1964).  For example, in 
networks consisting of known and recognized 
participants, individuals can base their 
personal interactions on the expected 
behaviors of other individuals.  When dyadic 
relationships develop, the motivations of 
reputation and status may become more 
relevant, the effectiveness of sanctions and 
control may increase, and expectations of 
obligations, direct reciprocity and feelings of 
dyadic trust may also be strengthened (Blau 
1964).  In the case of tight restriction on 
membership and recognition between 
individuals, we would no longer consider the 
network to be an electronic network of 
practice, but more akin to a virtual workgroup, 
team or electronic community of practice.  
Computer-Mediated Communication 
Our definition limits electronic 
networks of practice to computer-mediated 
communication.  This limitation is relevant 
because the phenomenon of interest is the 
network that is created through message 
exchange and the public good of knowledge 
that results from archiving the messages.  This 
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does not mean that individuals participating in 
an electronic network of practice do not have 
private alternatives for communication, such 
as e-mail.  However, private exchanges may 
have an impact on knowledge exchange in the 
network.  For instance, if members prefer to 
privately ask each other questions without 
making the exchange openly available, the 
knowledge also remains private, which may 
limit the value of the public good.  Exchanges 
that occur outside of the electronic network of 
practice do not become part of the public good 
and are considered private actions rather than 
collective actions, thus they fall outside the 
scope of the theories presented here.     
Also, although we focus on electronic 
networks of practice that exist solely in 
electronic space, our definition recognizes that 
electronic networks of practice may be created 
to support communications within collectives 
that have a corresponding physical entity, such 
as professional associations.  In the case of a 
corresponding physical entity, the collective 
action theories presented here still apply and 
may actually lead to higher levels of collective 
action.  For example, supporting a 
corresponding physical entity may result in 
more individuals having personal, face-to-face 
relationships, which in turn might increase the 
density of the ties in the electronic network.  
We would also expect that a corresponding 
physical entity might result in stronger 
affective relationships characterized by trust, 
organizational citizenship, commitment and 
professional affiliation among participants and 
lead to higher levels of collective action.  On 
the other hand, a physical entity may enable 
more private alternatives, thereby reducing the 
level of collective action in the electronic 
network of practice and limiting the creation of 
the public good.  It is also important to note 
that electronic networks of practice that 
support a corresponding physical entity may 
no longer be completely open.  As noted 
above, the relevance of collective action 
theories also depends upon the extent of 
restricted access, which may have both 
positive and negative consequences.  
Therefore, another interesting area of future 
research examines whether collective action in 
electronic networks of practice is more 
successful when the practice of interest 
corresponds to a physical entity such as a 
profession, and whether or not this success is 
attributable to characteristics of the physical 
entity, restricted access or a combination of 
both.   
Public Good or Virtual Common 
We have proposed that the knowledge 
generated and archived through message 
postings is a pure public good, nonrival in its 
consumption and nonexcludable once 
produced.  Because we assume that the 
knowledge is not depleted in its consumption, 
anyone with an interest in the practice can 
access the knowledge without diminishing the 
availability to others.  Under this condition, 
free-riders or lurkers have no impact on 
collective benefits.  However, not all forms of 
knowledge exchange produce a public good.  
For example, some electronic networks have a 
norm where questions are posted publicly to 
the network, but responses are sent privately to 
the individual posting the question rather than 
to the network as a whole.  In this scenario, 
there is the potential for the same question to 
be asked multiple times, which creates 
additional costs every time answers have to be 
repeated.  These networks would still be 
considered electronic networks of practice and 
researchers could still apply theories of 
collective action, but the scenario changes.  
The mutual engagement in practice is no 
longer visible to everyone in the network 
(potentially reducing the motivations of status 
and reputation, the ability to monitor, and the 
effectiveness of social sanctions), and the 
collective action does not result in a public 
good available to all.  Applying collective 
action theories, in this case we might expect 
lower levels of collective action and lower 
levels of collective benefits since the 
knowledge is not made publicly available as a 
collective good.  This is another area in need 
of further research. 
Finally, although we focus on collective 
action that results in an archive of messages, 
which creates a pure public good, there are 
other resources in electronic networks of 
practice that may be rival or subtractable (i.e., 
used up in their consumption).  Researchers 
have suggested that electronic networks of 
practice may be conceptualized as common-
pool resources rather than public goods 
(Kollock 1999; Kollock and Smith 1996; Lee 
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2002).  A common-pool resource is a resource 
that is sufficiently large so as to make it costly 
to exclude beneficiaries, even though it is 
subtractable rather than nonrival and 
diminishes with consumption (Ostrom 1990). 
This leads to the second type of social 
dilemma, the tragedy of the commons.  The 
tragedy of the commons dilemma involves the 
consumption or replenishment of a common-
pool resource where the use of the common-
pool resource by one individual diminishes the 
availability of the resource to another 
individual, resulting in the “tragedy of the 
commons” (Kollock and Smith 1996). 
Examination of the commons dilemma 
and the exploitation of rival resources in 
electronic networks of practice is another area 
in need of further research.  For example, one 
potentially subtractable resource is the 
bandwidth made available by the technology.  
In this case, activities that waste bandwidth, 
such as spam (mass messages that are off-
topic), can lead to the destruction of the 
resource unless controlled (Lee 2002).  
Another potential subtractable resource is the 
pool of collective expertise or individual 
attention available to the collective.  Given a 
finite amount of expert knowledge and 
individual attention available to the electronic 
network of practice, posting questions without 
responding to others in return may consume 
the common-pool resource of expert attention.  
Another set of problems arises when the 
network becomes so large in terms of the 
number of available messages, that individuals 
have a difficult time “separating the wheat 
from the chaff”.  We propose that theories of 
collective action are still relevant in this 
context, and this area of research is 
particularly relevant since acts of self-interest 
and free-riding actually destroy common-pool 
resources.  Thus, a final area of potential 
research is the examination of resources in 
electronic networks of practice that are rival 
through applying theories of collective action 
and the tragedy of the commons dilemma. 
CONCLUSION 
Although there has been a significant 
increase in networked communication and 
growing interest in the topics of virtual 
organizing, to date researchers have yet to 
establish consistent terminology describing the 
context of interest and have paid little attention 
to how specific characteristics of electronic 
networks influence social dynamics.  In 
addition, advances in this area have been 
hampered by the lack of theoretical 
development and consistent theoretical 
application.  Our purpose was to offer a clear 
definition of one type of online social 
structure, an electronic network of practice, 
and describe its key characteristics.  We then 
proposed that theories of public goods, social 
dilemmas, and collective action may facilitate 
our understanding of a variety of issues in 
electronic networks of practice.  We ended the 
paper by discussing how altering our definition 
of an electronic network of practice and how 
changing the focus from a public good of 
archived messages to a common-pool resource 
may change the theories that apply.  A major 
conclusion of this paper is that researchers 
investigating the dynamics of electronic 
networks of practice should pay careful 
attention to the actual characteristics of the 
electronic network since these defining 
characteristics are important for theory 
selection and the generalizability of findings.  
Researchers should also be aware of the 
characteristics of the collective good, whether 
public or common, and select the appropriate 
theories and methods for study.   
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